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addition to her statutory widow's allowance of $2000, might be
allowed a homestead exemption on real estate which was occupied7
by her as a home. The case of Wallace v. First National Bank,
decides that a widow may have both a widow's allowance and a
homestead exemption. The court also held that the widow could
occupy the home under her homestead during the period of administration. Attention is called to 1951 Session Laws, ch. 214, p. 522,
where the exemption is raised from $2,000 to $5,000.
Although the court, in Mitchell v. Espinosa supra, and in the
case of Johnson v. McLaughlin,8 evidenced a continuation of a
reasonable interpretation of the validity of tax deeds, Siler v. Investment Securities Co." indicates that a Treasurer's Deed may be
attacked where the Treasurer did not send notices to the proper
address of the fee title owner even though there was a current address in his office to which tax notices on other property had been
sent.
In Rochester v. Richards,0 the court discusses at some length
whether the word "and" or the word "or" will be supplied in place
of a comma between the name of the legatee and the following words
which were descriptive of the interest the legatee took. The case
would seem to indicate that a comma should never be used where
words of limitation are intended as in the following phrase: "to
Joe Doakes, his heirs and assigns," but rather the phrase should
read: Joe Doakes and his heirs and assigns." Likewise, if a substitution is intended, the phrase should substitute the word "or" instead of a comma-"to Joe Doakes or his heirs or assigns."

SURETYSHIP, INSURANCE AND TORTS
LOUIS G. ISAACSON
SURETYSHIP
Our Court has considered three cases on this subject, two of
them, Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. Central Finance I and Mass.
Bonding Co. v. Bank of Aurora,2 involving the relatively new motor
vehicle bonds. In the first of these cases, the attorneys who had entered an appearance for both the bonding company and the defaulting dealer permitted a judgment by default to be entered
against the dealer, and thereafter attempted to defend as to the
bonding company by showing that there was no evidence of fraud.
The Court held that the default judgment against the dealer resulted in an automatic judgment against the bonding company, being conclusive proof of the fraud necessary to recover on the bond.
In the second case, where the fraudulent transactions occurred
prior to the effective date of the bond but renewal notes and chattel
mortgages were taken thereafter, the Court denied recovery, hold246 P. 2d 894, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (June 16, 1952).

'242 P. 2d 812, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (March 17, 1952).
244 P. 2d 877, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 5, 1952).
10246 P. 2d 906, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (July 7, 1952).
1237 P. 2d 1079, 1951-2 C. B, A. Adv. Sh. (Oct. 15, 1951).
2 238 P. 2d 872, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 26, 1951).

DICTA

Nov., 1952

ing in effect that no new consideration was advanced by the bank
during the time when the bond was in effect.
The third case of Fifer . Mass. Bonding Co.3 involved a cost
bond in a divorce decree wh. n included attorney fees. Even though
the statute does not authorize such a bond, the Court held that it
had authority to order such a bond, and having executed the same,
the bonding company had no right to refuse to pay in accordance
with its terms.
INSURANCE

In the case of Mutual Insurance v. Daniels,4 our Court had
occasion to consider as a question of first impression a life insurance contract which contained both the standard aviation clause
and the statutory incontestability clause, and more particularly the
question as to whether the first was voided by the second in a case
of death of the insured while piloting a military plane. The Court
ruled that the incontestability clause cannot enlarge the scope of
the insuror's promise, but merely prohibits the company from contesting the validity of the policy at its inception. As a result, the
aviation clause was entitled to full weight and recovery was denied.
In Employers' Mutual v. Nicholas,5 the Court considered a
standard P.U.C. rider on a liability policy, which waives description of the motor vehicle, but obliges the insured to reimburse the
company for losses not specifically covered by the policy which
are paid by the company as a result of this rider. In a suit for reimbursement by the insurance company, recovery was denied on
the theory that the insurance company had settled the case without consulting the insured as to the amount of the settlement.
TORTS

The past year has been significant in that the Court has in
many instances drawn a line and said we will no longer stretch
legal theories out of sympathy for seriously injured litigants. For
instance, in Klatka v. Barker,6 a guest statute case, it was attempted to show that the deceased, a member of the Haxtun band,
was not a guest because the driver of his car was a public spirited
citizen and was receiving benefit from the fact that he was transporting a part of the band, and thus bringing glory to the town of
Haxtun. Recovery was denied with a statement that the benefit
conferred must be sufficiently real, tangible and substantial to serve
as an inducing cause for the transportation. Reliance was also
placed on the terms of the Colorado statute, which requires payment
as distinguished from other statutes which merely require compensation.
Similarly, in Greenwood v. Kier,7 our Court refused to further
extend the family car doctrine to a situation where a corporation
owned the truck, the wife owned stock in the corporation and per'238
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1122, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Dec. 10, 1951).
1064, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 5, 1952).
1120, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Dec. 10, 1951).
607, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Dec. 24, 1951).
417, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (March 31, 1952).
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mitted her husband to use the truck to go deer hunting. In a suit
against the wife, recovery was denied. Even though it was shown
that the husband was not employed, the Court found that this fact
did not rebut the presumption that he was the head of the family.
In the interesting case of Whiteside v. Harvey,8 our Court has
adopted the theory of constructive identity in a situation where the
Defendant had entrusted his truck to an employee to pick up a load
of potatoes. The employee, having played cards late at night, asked
his father to drive while he slept. Although the Court repeats that
nominally an employer is not liable for the acts of one whom the
employee permits to drive without authority, in this case the employer was held liable, since the father became the alter-ego of his
son; even though the son was asleep at the time of the accident,
the negligence of his father was imputed to him under this theory
of constructive identity.
The case of Field v. Sisters of Mercy 9 is mentioned only because here the Supreme Court finally permitted a summary judgment to stick. By admissions in the pleadings and depositions, it
appeared that the patient whom the Plaintiff was attempting to
visit in Mercy Hospital was not actually in that hospital. Accordingly, the Plaintiff became merely a licensee and was not entitled
to recover when she tripped over a suitcase in a darkened hall.
In Scott v. Greeley Joslin,10 the Court finally found a situation
where it could apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Here a customer was injured by a falling electric fan in a dressing room.
as to why the fan fell, +he fl,,I4
Although there- .vas no show.
reviewed all of the circumstances which it could conceive as causing the fan to fall and concluded that each must have been because
of the Defendant's negligence.
In Grand Junction v. Lashmett," a child's dress was ignited
by an open flare left by an excavation. The Court found that the
placing of such an open flare was not negligence as a matter of law,
since the utility of such a warning light out-weighed the danger
which was involved. Even in this situation, the Court repeated that
negligence must be proved and cannot be presumed.
In Carr v. Mile High Kennel,12 a customer at the dog track,
walking down the stairs, was injured by other customers playing
leap frog. Once again, recovery was denied because no affirmative
evidence of negligence was produced. The Court once again found
that the track was not an insuror of its customers' safety and
could not be expected to anticipate that its customers would be
playing leap-frog on the stairway.
In McBride v. Woods,'13 a judgment was reversed because the
Court had given an instruction defining unavoidable accident. In
this case, the Defendant had been backing out of a parking place
8239 P. 2d 989, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh.
' 245 P. 2d 1167, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh.
10243 P. 2d 394, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh.
111951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 489 (Aug. 29,
1 242 P. 2d 238, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh.
Is 238 P. 2d 183, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh.

(Dec. 17, 1951).
(June 16, 1952).
(April 7, 1952).
1952).
(March 10, 1952).
(Oct. 15, 1951).
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into a cross-walk, and under these circumstances, the Court held
that it could not have been unavoidable since the act of backing a
car into a cross-walk is such a hazardous undertaking that there
was a duty on the driver to make certain no pedestrian was there.
We cannot conclude this subject of torts without calling attention to our Supreme Court's final complete capitulation to the
4
mechanical world in which we live. In Winterberg v. Thomas,1
the ultimate question to be determined was whether the Plaintiff
had gone through a green light or a red light. Although the Plaintiff testified that he went through a green light, although his testimony was substantiated by another witness, and although there
was testimony that the Defendant at one time had admitted that
the Plaintiff had the green light, and finally despite the fact that
the jury in its verdict believed this testimony and found for the
Plaintiff, our Court nevertheless reversed the verdict, stating that
the court should have taken the case away from the jury because
a city engineer of Denver had testified as a mathematical fact that
the light must have been red.

TAXATION, PUBLIC UTILITIES AND LOCAL GOV'T
STANLEY L. DREXLER

Our Court last year decided 22 cases dealing with these subjects. In view of this fecundity, the probable prolixity of my colleagues, the scope of this program and the limitations of time, I
claim immunity from being held in contempt for treating 16 of
these decisions as unworthy of mention.
TAXATION

Of the six remaining cases, the one most likely to achieve
immortality-at least among my brethern of the tax bar-is
Cass v. Dameron.' I am told by representatives of the Department
of Justice, which represents the taxpayer pursuant to the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, that by the time thesd remarks are
spoken a petition for certiorariwill have been filed by the Attorney
General of the United States in the United States Supreme Court.
Claiborne Dameron, domiciled in Louisiana, in 1948 was a
major in the United States Air Force, stationed at Lowry Field
Air base. He and his family lived in an apartment in Denver. There
he had household goods of an assessed value of $460. On this he
paid under protest to Roy W. Cass Manager of Revenue and ExOfficio Treasurer of the City and County of Denver, a tax of $23.31.
He filed suit to recover this tax and had judgment in the District
Court. Mr. Cass appealed. The Supreme Court reversed.
As I read the applicable provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act, Major Dameron's personal property, tangible or
intangible, not used in a commercial enterprise, is denied a situs
for State or local taxation outside of Louisiana. As the Court reads
12246 P. 2d 1058, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (July 7, 1952).
'244 P. 2d 1082, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 12, 1952).

